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Digital Asset Custody Models: Lessons from Coinbase

As Vietnam pilots its crypto asset market, custody should be understood as a critical safety and security component of digital financial infrastructure, rather than merely a technical choice between hot and cold wallets. The experience of Coinbase, the largest crypto asset exchange in the United States, with a market capitalization above USD 60 billion, shows that modern risk arises mainly from digital identity, the human factor and the service supply chain, requiring custody to be approached as a chain of control rather than through isolated, fragmented rules.

As Vietnam builds, step by step, a pilot legal framework for the digital asset market, designing safety and security standards for the centralized exchange (CEX) model calls for a new approach to the concept of “custody.” Where custody was once reduced to managing private keys and choosing between hot and cold wallets, practice at major institutions shows that modern risk rarely comes from breaking core cryptographic algorithms. Instead, threats mainly stem from digital identity, user behavior, the human factor inside organizations and weak points in the service supply chain.

In other words, if blockchain is designed to make “cracking” it nearly impossible, the entire operating process still contains many points that can be exploited, such as operational errors, insider attacks or the exploitation of third-party partners. Custody in the digital asset era must therefore be understood as an architecture of ownership and control, safeguarded not only by technology but also by governance processes, operating principles and legal mechanisms.

The lessons from Coinbase, the largest crypto asset exchange in the United States with a market capitalization above USD 60 billion and also one of the largest digital asset custodians in the US, are well worth studying. It is an institution operating under a high degree of oversight and standardization, and it holds a central position in US crypto asset infrastructure.

Founded in 2012 in San Francisco, Coinbase is one of the largest crypto asset exchanges in the United States and the first company in the sector to list directly on Nasdaq (ticker COIN), in April 2021.

With hundreds of millions of users worldwide, Coinbase is not just a trading platform but also acts as the vault for the digital assets of the institutional market. This role was reinforced when the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved spot Bitcoin ETFs in early 2024: Coinbase was chosen as custodian for many major fund issuers. That very standing makes Coinbase a target of the most sophisticated attacks, and also a place that clearly shows the shift in risk in the digital asset market: from technical attacks to process attacks.

Incidents on record involving Coinbase show a consistent pattern: attackers seek to exploit weaknesses in identity and authentication processes rather than break blockchain's security layers. A typical example is account takeover through weaknesses in the SMS recovery process. In essence, for end users, the login account is the wallet.

When a weak authentication method such as SMS is bypassed through SIM swapping, the system may by default accept the attacker as the legitimate owner. This shows that identity security is an inseparable component of custody. Platforms that want a high level of protection must accept trading off some user experience to deploy stronger authentication, from secure hardware and advanced multi-factor authentication to behavioral controls such as withdrawal limits, waiting periods and “cooling off” of sensitive changes to account profiles. From March to May 2021, around 6,000 Coinbase customers had their assets completely drained from their wallets.

On the other side, risk comes not only from users but also from inside. In February 2023, a hacker group (believed to be linked to the 0ktapus group) launched a mass attack campaign against Coinbase employees. They sent SMS messages impersonating the IT department, asking employees to log in through a fake link to “receive an urgent notice.” The sophisticated phishing campaigns aimed at employees show that hackers do not need to break through technical defenses; they only need to exploit a lapse to capture access credentials.

In modern custody models, controlling internal access is no less important than protecting wallets. Attackers need only compromise one internal account or exploit an operational mistake to go deep into the chain of systems. A mature custody model must therefore be designed on “zero trust” principles (no default trust), with segmented systems, least privilege and multi-layer controls, ensuring that even if one internal account is breached, attackers still cannot reach the “custody core,” where signing authority or control of asset flows resides.

From 2024 until now, the risk picture has widened to a new weak point: the supply chain and KYC data. When customer identity data leaks from subcontractors or third parties, it becomes “raw material” for social engineering attacks against both users and customer support processes. Here the incident is no longer about wallets but about data and operations: a technical system can be very secure yet still be broken if the customer support process is manipulated or staff are tricked into reissuing access. This confirms that custody is not only “holding money” but also protecting data, monitoring access behavior and tightly controlling the entire chain of service partners.

The common thread in the risks above is that attackers try to break the chain of control rather than attack private keys directly. Effective defense in a centralized exchange model is therefore not just putting up firewalls or strengthening encryption, but designing the process chain so that no single failure, whether from a user, an employee or a partner, can lead to a major loss.

Custody must therefore be approached as an end-to-end chain of control, comprising separation of duties among operations, security and key custody; multi-layer controls in which high-value transactions must go through multi-signature or multi-party computation (MPC) with the approval of several independent individuals; and resilience capabilities to contain risk, prevent spread and trigger a response when anomalies are detected.

In Vietnam's context, these lessons need to be placed on a new policy foundation. Since January 1, 2026, the Law on Digital Technology Industry has been in effect and has defined crypto assets as a type of digital asset, thereby affirming them as assets recognized by law. Notably, the Law cross-refers to the 2015 Civil Code, so transactions involving crypto assets, from establishing ownership, transfer and obligations to compensation, can be invoked directly under the existing legal system, even though subordinate legislation is not yet fully complete. This is the key point: instead of waiting for enough decrees and circulars to control risk, Vietnam already has an asset framework to identify, value and assign liability, from which custody standards can be designed on an existing legal foundation.

In parallel, Decision No. 2815/QD-TTg identifies blockchain as a strategic technology within the Government's group of six strategic technology products prioritized for immediate implementation. The policy message is clear: blockchain is not just a technology trend but strategic infrastructure that needs investment, development and standardization. Custody and safety and security standards for crypto assets should therefore be approached as a component of national digital financial infrastructure, not merely an ordinary fintech service.

AUTHOR

Phan Duc Trung - Chairman of the Vietnam Blockchain and Digital Assets Association, Chairman of VMatrix

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